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I. Introduction 
Across diverse legal traditions, the search for truth is a basic function of the 
criminal process.2 Uncovering the truth about the charged crime is regarded as an 
essential precondition to achieving justice, enforcing criminal law, and legitimating the 
verdict.3 Yet while truthseeking is a broadly accepted goal in the criminal process, no 
system seeks the truth at all costs. The search for truth must on occasion yield to 
considerations related to efficiency, democratic participation, and protection of 
individual rights.  
Different jurisdictions around the world show different preferences with respect 
to the tradeoffs between these values and the search for truth in criminal procedure. In 
                                                 
1 Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law. I thank Darryl Brown, Maximo Langer, Saira Mohamed, 
Meghan Ryan, Darryl Robinson, Sonja Starr, James Stewart, John Turner, Thomas Weigend, and 
participants in the workshop at the Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure at the University of 
Cologne, the SMU Faculty Forum, and the SMU Criminal Justice Colloquium for helpful comments on 
earlier drafts. Tom Kimbrough provided invaluable research assistance. I am also grateful to the Mike 
and Marla Boone Faculty Fund for a generous research grant in support of this project. 
2 E.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986) (“The central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the 
factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.”); Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) 
(“The basic purpose of a trial is the determination of the truth.”); R. v. Levogiannis, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 475; 
Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of March 19, 2013, BVerfG, 2 BvR 2628/10, BvR 2883/10, 2 
BvR 2155/11.  
3 On the link between truth and legitimacy in criminal cases, see, for example, LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, 
ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 2 (2006); FRAUKE STAMP, DIE WAHRHEIT IM 
STRAFVERFAHREN 22-23, 265 (1998) (observing that truthfulness is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for a legitimate verdict); Thomas Weigend, Is the Criminal Process About Truth?: A German Perspective, 26 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 157, 157-58 (2003). 
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an effort to promote efficiency, enhance democratic participation, or protect individual 
rights, legal systems tolerate certain procedures that are known to heighten the risk of 
inaccurate outcomes.4 Some of these procedural preferences can be explained with 
reference to the influence of the adversarial and inquisitorial traditions.5 But the 
distinction between adversarial and inquisitorial systems on this point is not always 
clear. Great variation exists within these two traditions, and common approaches can be 
seen across the divide.  
Some truth-limiting procedures, such as those related to the exclusionary rule 
and the protection of individual rights, have been adopted largely across the globe and 
have proven amenable to adjustments that accommodate the concern for truth. Other 
measures, such as lay participation in the criminal process, have retained their hold in 
some countries but have not spread to many others. Finally, one category of practices 
generally acknowledged to conflict with truthseeking—plea bargaining and other 
methods of negotiated justice—have become increasingly prevalent, but have proven 
the most difficult to regulate and to align with the search for truth. 
II. Promoting Individual Rights: Double Jeopardy and Exclusionary Rules 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., LAUDAN, supra note 3, at 213-33; STAMP, supra note 3, at 91-93; Mirjan Damaška, Truth in 
Adjudication, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 289, 301 (1997-1998); Wayne R. LaFave et al., Implementing the Enforcement of 
the Substantive Law, 1 CRIM. PROC. § 1.5(a) (2012); Weigend, supra note 3, at 167-68; see also Donald A. 
Dripps, The Substance-Procedure Relationship in Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 409,  410-11 (R.A. Duff & Stuart Green eds. 2011). 
5 See LAUDAN, supra note 3, at 24-25; WILLIAM PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH (2000); Elisabetta Grande, 
Dances of Criminal Justice: Thoughts on Systemic Differences and the Search for the Truth, in CRIME, PROCEDURE 
AND EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 145, 145-48 (John Jackson et al. eds., 
2008);  Gerson Trüg & Hans-Jürgen Kerner, Formalisierung der Wahrheitsfindung im (reformiert-) 
inquisitorischen Strafverfahren? Betrachtungen unter rechtsvergleichender Perspektive, in RECHT GESTALTEN – 
DEM RECHT DIENEN, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR REINHARD BÖTTCHER 191, 193-94 (Heinz Schöch et al. eds., 2007);  
Mirjan R. Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative 
Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 578-89 (1973); Weigend, supra note 3. But see Heike Jung, Nothing But the 
Truth? Facts, Impressions, and Confessions about Truth in Criminal Procedure, in TRIAL ON TRIAL 147, 152 
(Anthony Duff et al. eds., 2004); Thomas Weigend, Should We Search for the Truth, and Who Should Do It?, 
36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 389, 401-02 (2011). 
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Perhaps the most universally accepted reason for limiting the search for truth 
concerns the protection of individual rights such as dignity, privacy, and liberty. The 
willingness to compromise the search for truth in the service of individual rights 
influences a host of criminal procedures in both adversarial and inquisitorial 
jurisdictions—from heightened burdens of proof to witness privileges to exclusionary 
rules. 
Since World War II and the rise of international human rights law, the protection 
of individual liberties has become a more central goal of criminal justice systems 
around the world. Many of the procedural rights that developed in the process—the 
right to counsel, to an impartial adjudicator, to confront adverse witnesses, and to 
receive notice of charges—are generally consistent with an emphasis on accuracy in 
criminal cases. But certain individual protections, including the privilege against self-
incrimination, the ban on double jeopardy, and rules for excluding unlawfully obtained 
evidence, may impair the search for truth.6 Under the influence of human rights ideals, 
countries around the world have come closer together in their willingness to adopt 
these protections and limit the search for truth when necessary to ensure fairness.7 
Nonetheless, there remain some perceptible differences in the way adversarial and 
inquisitorial systems balance these values.  
One of the most powerful influences on the shape of adversarial criminal 
procedures has been the maxim that “It is better that ten guilty persons escape than that 
one innocent suffer.”8 Recognizing that errors are inevitable in any realm of human 
decision-making, this maxim suggests that we should opt for distributing errors away 
from wrongful convictions. Jurisdictions that take this “innocence-weighted” approach 
                                                 
6 E.g., LAUDAN, supra note 3, at 3, 91; Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1374-1381, 1407 (1991); Weigend, supra note 3, at 161-62. 
7 E.g., Jung, supra note 5, at 153; Weigend, supra note 5, at 405. 
8 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, c. 27, margin p.358. For variations on 
this formula, both before and after Blackstone, see LAUDAN, supra note 3, at 63; Alexander Volokh, N 
Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997). 
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thus aim to avoid mistaken convictions even when this diminishes accuracy overall and 
results in a greater number of wrongful acquittals.9  
Although the “innocence-weighted” procedural preference has historically been 
more prominent in adversarial systems, it can be seen across the adversarial-
inquisitorial spectrum and is enshrined in key provisions of international human rights 
conventions.10 The reasonable doubt standard, for example, which sacrifices some 
accuracy for the sake of reducing wrongful convictions, is shared by a number of 
adversarial and inquisitorial systems, and now by international criminal courts.11 
Likewise, the right to remain silent, which reduces the amount of information available 
to factfinders, is now accepted widely at least in part in order to ensure that innocent 
persons do not falsely incriminate themselves.12  
A. Double Jeopardy and the Ban on Appeals of Acquittals  
The “innocence-weighted” approach, however, remains somewhat more 
prominent in jurisdictions belonging to the adversarial tradition. One manifestation of 
                                                 
9 Stacy, supra note 6, at 1407. 
10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/, art. 14 
(March 24, 1976); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6, June 
1, 2010, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
11 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 66(3), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 1, 2002); 
ICTY R. PROC. & EVID. R. 87(A); General Comment No. 32, HRC, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32, Aug. 23, 2007, 
¶ 30; Guido Acquaviva, Written and Oral Evidence, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 99, 100 (Linda 
Carter & Fausto Pocar eds. 2013). Tom Stacy has explained how the beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
may be seen as truth-impairing: 
As compared with a preponderance of the evidence standard, the requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt increases the overall incidence of erroneous verdicts. Unlike the preponderance 
of the evidence standard, it requires that the defendant prevail in cases where the weight of the 
evidence points decidedly but not overwhelmingly towards her guilt. Over the run of cases, 
fewer errors will occur if the verdict is rendered according to the weight of the evidence. . . . The 
reasonable doubt standard is truth-furthering only if one's definition of accuracy distinguishes 
between erroneous convictions and erroneous acquittals, treats erroneous convictions as worse 
than erroneous acquittals, and seeks in part to minimize the occurrence of erroneous convictions. 
Stacy, supra note 6, at 1405-06. 
12 See, e.g., Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17 (2001). While the right to remain silent protects against some false 
self-incriminations, it also produces more false acquittals. E.g., LAUDAN, supra note 3, at 150. 
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this approach is the ban on appeals of acquittals. Adversarial systems typically prohibit 
the prosecution from appealing acquittals, while inquisitorial systems grant the 
prosecution and the defense equal rights to appeal, regardless of the verdict. The 
asymmetrical appeals mechanism in adversarial systems means that legal or factual 
errors which favor defendants may remain uncorrected. The willingness to adopt a 
procedure that hinders the ability of the legal system to correct mistakes can be 
explained at least in part by a desire to minimize the risk of false convictions.  
The ban on appeals of acquittals is often traced back to the general restriction on 
all appeals of criminal judgments under the common law.13 While neither defendants 
nor prosecutors had the ability to obtain review of most criminal judgments in the early 
days of the common law, by the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, concerns 
about false convictions led many common-law jurisdictions to create a system of 
appeals.14 Yet courts and lawmakers believed that appeals of acquittals would violate 
the doctrine of double jeopardy, so the new appellate remedies applied only to 
convictions.15  
The asymmetrical system of appeals has been defended on several policy 
grounds. First, the procedure is championed as necessary to protect innocent 
defendants from being overwhelmed by the pressures of an appeal and potential 
                                                 
13 MIRJAN DAMAS KA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE 
LEGAL PROCESS 60 (1991); The Law Reform Commission (Ireland), Consultation Paper on Prosecution 
Appeals in Cases Brought on Indictment ¶ 1.04 (2002), at 
http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/consultation%20papers/cpProsecutionAppeals.htm (citing JAMES 
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, 1 HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 308-10 (1st ed., 1883, reprinted in 1996)). 
14 LAUDAN, supra note 3, at 199; The Law Reform Commission (Ireland), supra note 13, ¶ 1.18. 
15 For the common law provenance, see The Law Reform Commission (Ireland), supra note 13, ¶ 1.02 
(citing R. v. Chairman and Justices of the County of Tyrone for the proposition that it was an “elementary” 
and “a broad principle of common law” that “an acquittal made by a Court of competent jurisdiction and 
made within its jurisdiction, although erroneous in point of fact, cannot as a rule be questioned and 
brought before any other court.”). For the link to double jeopardy, see Kepner v. United States 195 U.S. 
100 (1904); see also Thompson v. Master-Touch TV Service Pty Ltd. (No.3) (1978) 38 FLR 397, 403 (Fed. Ct. 
Austl.). 
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retrial.16 Second, it is justified on the grounds that it reduces the risk that some 
acquittals might be erroneously reversed on appeal.17 In cases decided by juries, it is 
also prized for protecting the jury’s autonomy, and in particular, the jury’s power to 
render a verdict against the evidence.18 
From a truthseeking perspective, however, the ban on appeal of acquittals 
imposes significant costs as it precludes courts from correcting factual errors that favor 
defendants.19 In a reflection of these concerns, inquisitorial countries and international 
criminal courts have rejected asymmetric appeals. The inquisitorial position—giving 
equal appellate rights to the defense and the prosecution—is formally rooted in a 
different understanding of double jeopardy.20 While adversarial systems generally 
consider a trial verdict to be a final judgment for purposes of double jeopardy,21 
inquisitorial systems deem criminal judgments to be final only after all appellate 
remedies have been exhausted.22 But this different interpretation of double jeopardy is 
ultimately grounded in a stronger preference for procedures that aid the search for 
truth.23 
While the adversarial-inquisitorial split on appeals of acquittals remains clear, it 
has become narrower since the 1960s, as concerns about accuracy have grown more 
dominant in certain common-law jurisdictions. Several common-law countries have 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); see also Matteo Rizzolli, Why Public 
Prosecutors Cannot Appeal Acquittals, XV STUDI E NOTE DI ECONOMIA 81, 94 (2010); Peter Westen, The Three 
Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1007 
(1980). 
17 Rizzolli, supra note 16, at 95; Westen, supra note 16, at 1010-11. 
18 Westen, supra note 16, at 1016-18.  
19 E.g., LAUDAN, supra note 3, at 194-212. 
20 See, e.g., John D. Jackson & Nikolay P. Kovalev, Lay Adjudication and Human Rights in Europe, 13 COLUM. 
J. EUR. L. 83, 117-18 (2006/2007).  
21 See id.; David Rudstein, Prosecution Appeals of Court-Ordered Midtrial Acquittals: Permissible Under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause? 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 91, 95 n.22 (2012). For an elaboration on how this fits with the 
“horizontal” model of adjudication in common-law countries, see DAMAŠKA, supra note 13, at 59-60. 
22 Jackson & Kovalev, supra note 20, at 117-18. Cf.  Maresti v. Croatia, [2009] ECHR 981, ¶¶ 62-63. 
23 Grande, supra note 5, at 160. 
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allowed the prosecution to appeal questions of law even after acquittals.24 In a few of 
these, the appeal is “with prejudice”—meaning that it may result in a reversal of the 
judgment.25 In others, the appeal is “without prejudice,” meaning that the appellate 
decision is merely declaratory.26 In the United States, the law has also expanded the 
availability of prosecutorial appeals. Statutes and case law in a majority of states permit 
prosecutors to challenge dismissals of charges and the exclusion of evidence through 
interlocutory appeals at the pretrial stage.27 Even after trial, prosecutors may now 
appeal a verdict favorable to the defendant where the defendant obtains a dismissal of 
the case “on grounds unrelated to guilt or innocence”28 or when a judge sets aside a jury 
conviction and acquits the defendant.29  
Moving beyond appeals on legal issues, a few adversarial jurisdictions have 
introduced a more significant exception to double jeopardy principles, allowing re-
prosecution on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. With the advent of DNA 
testing, England and several Australian provinces have provided for the reopening of 
proceedings in certain serious crimes cases where new and compelling evidence 
justifies it.30 U.S. courts have also permitted successive prosecutions in certain limited 
                                                 
24 CRIM. CODE (Can.) § 676 (1985), upheld as constitutional in R v. Morgentaler [1988] 1 SCR 30, 156; CRIMES 
ACT (N.Z.) § 380 (1961); CRIM. PROC. ACT (S. Afr.) § 319 (1977). 
25 CRIM. CODE (Can.) § 676 (1985); CRIMES ACT (N.Z.) § 380 (1961); CRIM. PROC. ACT (S. Afr.) § 319 (1977). 
26 CRIM. JUST. ACT (Eng.) §§ 36(1)-(3), (7) (1972); CRIM. PROC. ACT (Scot.) § 123(1) (1995); CRIM. PROC. ACT 
(Ireland) § 11 (1993) (without prejudice appeals of acquittals for judge-directed acquittals only). Ireland is 
currently reviewing proposals to expand further its system of appeals of acquittals. The Law Reform 
Commission (Ireland), supra note 13. 
27 This is a departure from the common-law position prohibiting government appeals. MARC L. MILLER & 
RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION 751 (3rd ed. 2007). 
28 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96 (1978). The Court in Scott clarified that appeal was permitted 
because the defendant had not in fact been acquitted: The proceedings had been terminated “on a basis 
unrelated to factual guilt or innocence.” Id. at 99.  
29 Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467 (2005) (citing United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352-353 
(1975)). 
30 CRIM. JUST. ACT § 78 (2003) (Eng.); Crown Prosecution Service, Legal Guidance: Retrial of Serious 
Offences, at http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/retrial_of_serious_offences; Vicki Waye & Paul Marcus, 
Australia and the United States: Two Common Criminal Justice Systems Uncommonly at Odds, Part 2, 18 TUL. J. 
INT'L & COMP. L. 335, 357-59 (2010); David Rudstein, Retrying the Acquitted in England, Part I: The Exception 
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cases of newly available evidence. Under the “due diligence” exception to double 
jeopardy, a successive prosecution is not barred for a second offense when “additional 
facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or have not been discovered 
despite the exercise of due diligence.”31 At least in the realm of appeals and retrials, 
therefore, we are seeing some rebalancing of priorities and a greater emphasis on the 
discovery of truth among several adversarial systems. 
B. Excluding Unlawfully Obtained Evidence 
In an effort to ensure a fair process and protect individual rights, criminal justice 
systems may also adopt rules that exclude unlawfully obtained evidence. Such 
exclusionary rules tend to conflict with the search for truth, as they remove probative 
evidence from consideration by the judge or jury, and in some cases, entirely thwart the 
prosecution of guilty offenders.  
Exclusionary rules are often associated with common-law jurisdictions, and the 
American rule in particular is frequently described as the strictest and broadest. Yet 
most contemporary civil-law jurisdictions also have rules that prohibit the use of 
unlawfully obtained evidence; in fact, some of these rules predate common-law 
exclusionary rules.32 And while recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has continually 
narrowed the reach of the exclusionary rule in the United States, undermining the 
                                                                                                                                                             
to the Rule Against Double Jeopardy for “New and Compelling Evidence,” 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 387 (2007). In 
2008, New Zealand had also introduced a provision allowing retrials after acquittals where “new and 
compelling evidence” has been discovered, but this provision was repealed in 2013. CRIMES ACT (N.Z.) § 
378D, repealed by Section 6 of the Crimes Amendment Act (No 4) 2011 (2011 No 85). 
31 Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 n.7 (1977). For a discussion of the due diligence exception, see Anne 
Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection from Successive Prosecution: A Proposed Approach, 92 GEO. L.J. 1183 
(2004). 
32 See, e.g., MIRJAN DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 13-14 (1997); Stephen C. Thaman, Constitutional Rights 
in the Balance: Modern Exclusionary Rules and the Toleration of Police Lawlessness in the Search for Truth, 61 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 691, 696 (2011). According to the traditional common law rule, “the manner in which the 
evidence was obtained . . . was irrelevant to . . . its admissibility.” JOHN D. JACKSON & SARAH J. SUMMERS, 
THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE: BEYOND THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW 
TRADITIONS 153 (2012). 
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notion that the U.S. rule is mandatory,33 courts in a number of modern inquisitorial 
systems have begun taking a firmer approach to exclusion.34 
Categorization along adversarial and inquisitorial lines therefore does not appear 
useful with respect to the exclusionary rule—not only because of convergence among a 
number of adversarial and inquisitorial systems, but also because of significant 
divergence within each category.35 Within the inquisitorial camp, countries such as 
Argentina, France, Italy, and Spain have maintained to some degree a tradition of 
procedural nullities. Under the nullity approach, when investigative action violates 
certain specified statutory rules, the action is declared void and its evidentiary results 
may not be used.36 But with respect to evidence obtained as a result of other 
violations—to which nullities do not attach, but which affect fundamental rights—these 
countries take very different positions. Spain, Argentina and Italy provide near-
automatic exclusion, while France continues with a presumption of admissibility.37 
Other countries, such as Greece, Turkey, and Russia, have recently adopted mandatory 
                                                 
33 E.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2010); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009); United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). See generally TRACEY MACLIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT’S EXCLUSIONARY RULE 302-47 (2013). 
34 See, e.g., AYA GRUBER ET AL., PRACTICAL GLOBAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 216-19 (2012) (discussing 
Argentina); Lorena Bachmaier Winter, Spain: The Constitutional Court’s Move from Categorical Exclusion to 
Limited Balancing, in EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN COMPARATIVE LAW  209, 215 (Stephen C. Thaman ed. 2013); 
Adem Sözüer & Öznur Sevdiren, Turkey: The Move to Categorical Exclusion of Illegally Gathered Evidence, in 
EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN COMPARATIVE LAW, supra, at 287; Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos, The Exclusion of 
Improperly Obtained Evidence in Greece: Putting Constitutional Rights First, 11 INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 181, 186 
(2007). 
35 For an excellent analysis of exclusionary rules in different systems, see EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN 
COMPARATIVE LAW (Stephen C. Thaman ed. 2013). Cf. J.F. Nijboer, Common Law Tradition in Evidence 
Scholarship Observed from a Continental Perspective, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 299, 335 (1993) (“It is the lack of 
uniformity of the non-adversarial systems that causes the main difficulties in using the inquisitorial and 
the adversarial style or system or proceedings as basic models for comparison. . . .”). 
36 See, e.g., Giulio Illuminati, Italy: Statutory Nullities and Non-usability, in EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN 
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 35, at 235, 244-45; Jean Pradel, France: Procedural Nullities and Exclusion, in 
EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 35, at 145, 148-50. 
37  GRUBER ET AL., supra note 34, at 216-19; Alejandro D. Carrio & Alejandro M. Garro, Argentina, in 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 3, 20-25, 32 (Craig Bradley ed. 2nd ed. 2007); Richard Frase, 
France, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra, at 212-14; Illuminati, supra note 36, at 235, 
244-46, 258; Thaman, supra note 32, 698-700. 
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exclusionary rules under which unlawfully obtained evidence is generally 
inadmissible.38 Finally, a number of jurisdictions, both adversarial and inquisitorial, use 
a balancing approach, as part of which they consider a host of factors related to the 
fairness of the process and the accuracy of the verdict. 39 Contributing to this diversity, 
at least in Europe, is the reluctance of the European Court of Human Rights to lay down 
common rules pertaining to the admissibility of tainted evidence, except in certain 
extreme cases.40  
If the adversarial-inquisitorial dichotomy appears outdated, perhaps a more 
useful classification would be based on the values that the exclusionary rule aims to 
promote.41 One can distinguish four main categories here: 1) the reliability approach; 2) 
the vindication of rights approach; 3) the judicial integrity approach; and 4) the 
deterrence approach. Classification along these lines is not seamless, as the rules of 
many jurisdictions frequently aim to maximize more than one value at a time. But it has 
the advantage of reflecting more accurately how courts and lawmakers within different 
jurisdictions reason about the scope and function of their exclusionary rules. 
                                                 
38 Giannoulopoulos, supra note 34, at 186; Georgios Triantafyllou, Greece: From Statutory Nullities to a 
Categorical Statutory Exclusionary Rule, in EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 35, at 261; 
Sözüer & Sevdiren, supra note 34, at 287.  
39 EVID. ACT (N.Z.) § 30 (3) (2006); EVID. ACT  (CTH) § 138 (3) (1995); EVID. ACT (NSW) § 38(1995); R v. Grant, 
[2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 (Can.); Yissacharov  v. Chief Military Prosecutor, [2006] (1) Isr. L.R. 320, ¶ 70; Marie-
Aude Beernaert & Philip Traest, Belgium: From Categorical Nullities to a Judicially Created Balancing Test, in 
EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 35, at 161, 165-66. 
40 Khan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35394/97, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 45, ¶ 34 (2000): 
It is not the role of the Court to determine, as a matter of principle, whether particular types of 
evidence - for example, unlawfully obtained evidence - may be admissible or, indeed, whether 
the applicant was guilty or not. The question which must be answered is whether the 
proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was obtained, were fair. This 
involves an examination of the 'unlawfulness' in question and, where violation of another 
Convention right is concerned, the nature of the violation found. 
The Court has enforced an exclusionary rule only in cases where the evidence was obtained through 
torture or inhumane and degrading treatment. See infra note 51. 
41 For a similar approach, see Christopher Slobogin, A Comparative Perspective on the Exclusionary Rule in 
Search and Seizure Cases, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Jacqueline Ross 
& Stephen Thaman eds., forthcoming 2014). 
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Furthermore, to the extent we are interested in understanding why different systems 
choose to depart from the search for truth, it is helpful to examine the policy reasons 
behind such departures.  
Courts and commentators in both adversarial and inquisitorial systems 
occasionally justify exclusion on the grounds that it can help advance the search for 
truth. Under this approach, evidence is excluded when the methods used to obtain it 
have rendered it less reliable.42 For example, courts may favor exclusion of testimonial 
evidence, which is more likely to be tainted by unlawful investigative tactics, but not of 
physical evidence.43 The stricter treatment of testimonial evidence may be linked in part 
to the reprehensibility of the methods typically used to obtain it (e.g., torture, inhuman 
and degrading treatment, or deception). But a review of courts’ decisions on these 
issues reveals that the differential treatment of tangible and testimonial evidence is due 
at least in part to a concern that tainted testimony is likely to be unreliable and to impair 
the search for truth.44 While a focus on reliability can help explain certain features of 
exclusionary rules in some jurisdictions, it is not a satisfactory description of most 
modern exclusionary approaches, which sweep more broadly and often lead to the 
suppression of perfectly reliable evidence.45  
In a number of jurisdictions, the exclusion of evidence is defended primarily on 
the grounds that it is necessary to vindicate fundamental rights. This theory is referred 
to alternatively as the “rights theory,” the “remedial model,” or the “protective 
principle,”46 and it emphasizes the importance of providing an effective remedy to give 
                                                 
42 JACKSON & SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 154. 
43 See, e.g., Yissacharov  v. Chief Military Prosecutor, [2006] (1) Isr. L.R. 320, ¶ 71 (distinguishing between 
tangible and verbal evidence); Findlay Stark & Fiona Leverick, Scotland: A Plea for Consistency, in 
EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note, at 69, 87. 
44 See, e.g., R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, ¶ 110 (Can.); Chalmers v. H.M. Advocate 1954 JC 66, 83 (Scot.); 
Yissacharov, [2006] (1) Isr. L.R. ¶ 71. 
45 JACKSON & SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 154. 
46 Yissacharov, [2006] (1) Isr. L.R. 320, ¶ 60; JACKSON & SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 155; Andrew Ashworth, 
Excluding Evidence as Protecting Rights, [1977] CRIM. L. REV. 723. 
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meaning to individual rights. Without exclusion, provisions that protect fundamental 
rights are said to be reduced to “a form of words”47 such that they “might as well be 
stricken from the Constitution.”48 The U.S. Supreme Court followed this approach in 
some of its earlier opinions on the exclusionary rule, though the Court has since 
abandoned it.49 The “protective principle” nonetheless remains important in a number 
of other jurisdictions. 50 As might be expected, in countries that follow this principle, the 
nature of the right breached is a critical factor in the decision whether to exclude. Some 
jurisdictions reserve mandatory exclusion only for violations of certain fundamental or 
constitutional rights.51 Others place great weight on the type of right violated as part of 
a balancing test that determines whether exclusion is warranted.52  
Another justification for the exclusionary rule is that the rule helps preserve the 
integrity of the judicial system. Under this view, courts must exclude tainted evidence 
in order to avoid any perception that they are condoning illegal acts by government 
agents. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it in one of its early decisions on the 
exclusionary rule, courts must not become “accomplices in the willful disobedience of a 
Constitution they are sworn to uphold.”53  Instead, they must disown any evidence 
                                                 
47 Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). 
48 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914). 
49 See MACLIN, supra note 33, chap. 1 (discussing Boyd and Weeks). 
50 See, e.g., D.P.P. v. Kenny, [1990] 2 I.R. 110, 134 (justifying exclusion with reference to the 
“unambiguously expressed constitutional obligation ‘as far as practicable to defend and vindicate the 
personal rights of the citizen’”). See generally Slobogin, supra note 41, at 12.  
51 See, e.g., Jalloh v. Germany, 2006-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 281,¶ 105; Harutyunyan v. Armenia, 49 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
9, ¶¶ 65-66 (2009); Gäfgen v. Germany, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 42 (2011). Consistent with the “rights theory,” 
there is growing consensus that evidence obtained through torture or inhumane and degrading treatment 
should be suppressed, regardless of its reliability. JACKSON & SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 162.  
52 See, e.g., People (A.G.) v. O’Brien, [1965] I.R. 142, 147, 170; Arnaud Cras & Yvonne Marie Daly, Ireland: A 
Move to Categorical Exclusion?, in EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 35, at 33, 34; 
Zinovia Dellidou, The Investigative Stage of the Criminal Process in Greece, in SUSPECTS IN EUROPE 101, 123 
(Ed Cape et al. 2007). The German approach to exclusion might also be characterized this way. See, e.g., 
Weigend, supra note 3, at 401 (noting a “growing tendency [among German courts] toward rejecting 
evidence that was acquired in clear, conscious violation of a person’s constitutional rights”). 
53 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 978 (1984) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (“If such evidence is admitted, then the courts become not merely the final and necessary 
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gathered through unlawful acts by government agents in order to ensure that the trial is 
fair and legitimate54 and that the same standards of conduct apply to government actors 
and ordinary citizens..55  
In American jurisprudence, the integrity rationale was prominent in earlier days 
of the exclusionary rule,56 but has since been overtaken by a deterrence approach, at 
least at the federal level.57 It remains salient in other national and international 
jurisdictions, however, as well as in the academic literature.58 Under this approach, 
courts consider primarily the seriousness of the violation by law enforcement in 
deciding whether to exclude evidence.59 Because courts focus on the damage to the 
integrity of the justice system as a whole, this approach often gives rise to multi-factor 
balancing tests.60 Such tests may consider whether exclusion, to the extent it thwarts the 
adjudication of a serious crime, might itself threaten judicial integrity in some cases. 
                                                                                                                                                             
link in an unconstitutional chain of events, but its actual motivating force.”); A and Others v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department (No. 2) [2006] 2 AC 221, ¶ 87. 
54 See ANTONY DUFF ET AL., TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 109 (2007). 
55 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Our government is the potent, 
the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. . . . If the 
government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto 
himself; it invites anarchy.”). 
56 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223. 
57 See Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, ‘‘A More Majestic Conception”: The Importance of Judicial Integrity 
in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 47-49 (2010) (noting the decline of the integrity 
rationale in Supreme Court jurisprudence, but its continued prominence in some state courts). 
58 See, e.g., CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS § 24(2) (1982) (“the evidence shall be excluded if 
it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute”); R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, ¶¶ 68-70 (Can.); 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Admission of Material from the “Bar 
Table” (June 24, 2009); DUFF ET AL., supra note 54, at 108-09; Bloom & Fentin, supra note 57, at 47-49; 
Slobogin, supra note 41. 
59 Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Bar Table Motions ¶¶ 
60, 62–63 (Dec. 17, 2010); Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Admission of Material from 
the “Bar Table,”¶¶42-46. 
60 See, e.g., R v. Collins [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, 283 (Can.) (noting that administration of justice may be brought 
into disrepute if reliable evidence that is central to conviction is excluded because of a “trivial” breach by 
law enforcement); Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Admission of Material from the 
“Bar Table,”¶¶42-46 (considering the gravity of the violation, the impact on the rights of the accused, the 
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The preeminent justification for the exclusionary rule in contemporary U.S. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence is the deterrence of official misconduct. Under this view, 
the exclusionary rule should be used only when it would effectively dissuade law 
enforcement officials from violating the law in the future.61 Even when exclusion does 
deter misconduct, courts may still decide not to impose it, if the social costs of exclusion 
outweigh the benefits of deterrence.62 The cost-benefit analysis considers the availability 
of alternative sanctions, which may be able to discipline officers at a lesser cost to the 
administration of justice.63 It also examines whether misconduct was an isolated 
occurrence or part of a pattern, under the theory that systemic abuses are in greater 
need of deterrence.64 Finally, it considers officers’ state of mind and reserves discipline 
only for reckless or deliberate violations of the law.65 Although prominent in the United 
States, the deterrence approach has not been widely accepted elsewhere in the world.66 
Nonetheless, consistent with a focus on deterrence, a number of jurisdictions consider 
officers’ state of mind, the systemic nature of the misconduct, and the availability of 
alternative remedies in deciding whether to exclude evidence.67 
While the above discussion might suggest that jurisdictions choose one of four 
competing rationales for exclusion, in practice, many justify exclusion by reference to 
                                                                                                                                                             
level of involvement by agents of the ICC prosecution, and whether the agents acted in good faith). See 
generally Slobogin, supra note 41. 
61 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2010); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009); United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984). 
62 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591, 599; Herring, 555 U.S. at 141; Leon, 468 U.S. at 908. 
63 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591, 599. 
64 Herring, 555 U.S. at 144. 
65 Id. 
66 See, e.g., D.P.P. v. Kenny, [1990] 2 I.R. 110, 134 (“The detection of crime and the conviction of guilty 
persons, no matter how important they may be in relation to the ordering of society, cannot . . . outweigh 
the unambiguously expressed constitutional obligation ‘as far as practicable to defend and vindicate the 
personal rights of the citizen.’”); R. v. Mason [1988] 1 WLR 139, 144; Yissacharov  v. Chief Military 
Prosecutor, [2006] (1) Isr. L.R. 320, ¶ 60; Rinat Kitai Sangero & Yuval Merin, Israel: The Supreme Court’s 
New, Cautious Exclusionary Rule, in EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 34, at 93, 97.  
67 See, e.g., EVID. ACT (N.Z.)  § 30 (3) (2006); EVID. ACT (Cth) § 138 (3) (1995); R v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 
(Can.); Yissacharov, [2006] (1) Isr. L.R. ¶ 70. See generally Thaman, supra note 32, at 722-23. 
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multiple goals.68 Countries frequently adopt a discretionary approach, which tries to 
“find the proper balance between the protection of the rights of the accused and 
safeguarding the fairness and integrity of the criminal process, on the one hand, and 
competing values and interests, including the value of discovering the truth, fighting 
increasing crime and protecting public safety and the rights of victims, on the other.”69 
Factors commonly considered in this balancing analysis include: 1) the importance of 
the right breached; 2) the seriousness of the violation (including whether the violation 
was deliberate or reckless; isolated or part of a pattern); 3) the probative value and 
importance of the improperly obtained evidence; 4) the seriousness of the offence with 
which the defendant is charged; and 5) whether alternative remedies could provide 
adequate redress to the defendant.70  
The various factors in the balancing analysis aim to address different concerns. 
An emphasis on the type of right violated is consistent with the “protective principle.” 
Consideration of the gravity of the violation is linked to the systemic integrity rationale, 
while a few of the other factors reflect a concern for deterrence. Importantly, the third 
                                                 
68 See, e.g., Yissacharov, [2006] (1) Isr. L.R. ¶ 60; Winter, supra note 34, at 209 (citing STC 114/1984, Nov. 29, 
1984). 
69 Yissacharov, [2006] (1) Isr. L.R. 320, ¶ 62; see also S. AFR. CONST. § 35(5) (1996) (evidence obtained in 
violation of the Bill of Rights “must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial 
unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice”); POLICE & CRIM. EVID. ACT (ENG.) § 78 
(1984) (evidence would be excluded where it “would have such ad adverse effect on the fairness of the 
proceedings that the Court ought not to admit it”); R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, ¶¶ 68-71 (Can.); H.M. 
Advocate v. Higgins, S.L.T. (2006), 946, 950, SC, 9. 
70 EVID. ACT (N.Z.) § 30 (3) (2006); EVID. ACT (CTH) § 138 (3) (1995); EVID. ACT (NSW) § 38 (1995); see also 
Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353; Yissacharov, [2006] (1) Isr. L.R. ¶ 70; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06, Decision on the Admission of Material from the “Bar Table,” ¶¶ 42-46 (June 24, 2009); Prosecutor v. 
Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on the Defence “Objection to Intercept Evidence,” ¶ 63 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 3, 2003); Matthias J. Bogers & Lonneke Stevens, The 
Netherlands: Statutory Balancing and a Choice of Remedies, in EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN COMPARATIVE LAW, 
supra note 34, at 183, 204-06; Marc Groenhuijsen, Illegally Obtained Evidence: An Analysis of New Trends in 
the Criminal Justice System of the Netherlands, in THE XIIITH WORLD CONGRESS OF PROCEDURAL LAW: THE 
BELGIAN AND DUTCH REPORTS (2008), available at http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=92639; Sabine Gless, 
Germany: Balancing Truth Against Protected Constitutional Interests, in EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN 
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 34, at 113, 139. 
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inquiry—how probative the evidence is—attempts to minimize the conflict between 
truthseeking and the protection of individual rights. While the rest of the factors are not 
directly related to truth-seeking, they may nonetheless indirectly promote accuracy to 
the extent that they limit exclusion of reliable evidence.  
In addition to the diversity of formal rules of exclusion, considerable variation 
exists with respect to the rules’ practical implementation.71 Several factors may explain 
why the practice of exclusion often deviates from written rules. First, where 
exclusionary rules have been recently reformed, longstanding habits and traditional 
legal culture are likely to “translate” new laws into a practice that is more consonant 
with preexisting value commitments of the legal system (particularly a commitment to 
the search for truth).72 Second, where courts follow a balancing test that is drafted in 
broad terms and considers multiple factors, judges can easily place more weight on 
factors that maximize accuracy instead of factors that serve other stated purposes of 
exclusion.73 Deviation from exclusionary rules is likely to be easier in inquisitorial 
systems where the same judge who rules on the admissibility of evidence then decides 
on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. In that situation, even under a mandatory 
rule, “the taint from the forbidden but persuasive information cannot be avoided: it 
                                                 
71 See, e.g., Catherine Newcombe, Russia, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 397, 432 (Craig 
Bradley ed. 2nd ed. 2007); Margaret K. Lewis, Controlling Abuse To Maintain Control: The Exclusionary Rule 
in China, 43 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 629, 687-94 (2011). 
72 See JACKSON & SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 73-74. Cf. Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal 
Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2004) (describing the process of “translating” imported procedures to make them 
consistent with preexisting commitments of the host criminal justice system). 
73 See, e.g., Kuk Cho, The Japanese “Prosecutorial Justice” and Its Limited Exclusionary Rule, 12 COLUM. J. 
ASIAN L. 39, 66-67 (1998). But cf. Mike Madden, Marshalling the Data: An Empirical Analysis of Canada's 
Section 24(2) Case Law in the Wake of R. v. Grant, 15 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 229, 237 (noting a roughly 70%  rate 
of exclusion under the more concrete Canadian balancing test after R. v. Grant); Thierry Nadon, Le 
paragraphe 24(2) de la Charte au Québec depuis Grant : si la tendance se maintient!, (2011) 86 C.R. (6th) 33, 42 
(finding a 64% post-Grant exclusion rate in Quebec). 
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always affects the decision maker’s thinking.”74 Although reasoned opinions and 
appellate review diminish the odds that excluded evidence influences the court’s 
decision, judges trained to see their role above all as the elucidation of the truth are 
likely to find ways to conform the verdict to the true facts.75 Even categorical rules of 
exclusion may therefore prove frail in systems with a strong preexisting commitment to 
the search for truth.  
Finally, even when courts scrupulously apply mandatory exclusionary rules, a 
commitment to accuracy may produce some unanticipated adverse side effects. Judges 
concerned with truthseeking may interpret the scope of individual rights more 
narrowly in order to minimize the risk that exclusion would be warranted.76 Once the 
underlying rights are weakened, exclusionary rules become less meaningful, regardless 
of their strictness. 
The brief overview of exclusionary rules shows that they are an increasingly 
common feature of criminal justice systems around the world, although their scope and 
purpose differ significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.77 While the adoption of 
exclusionary rules can be seen as a triumph of individual rights over truthseeking, such 
rules typically contain numerous qualifications to allow courts to minimize the burden 
on the search for truth. Even where exclusionary rules appear quite strict on paper, in 
practice, they frequently give way to a concern for accuracy. 
III. Promoting Efficiency: Plea Bargaining 
                                                 
74 DAMAŠKA, supra note 32, at 47. For a discussion of empirical studies supporting this notion, see JACKSON 
& SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 72-73. 
75 See JACKSON & SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 73-74. 
76 Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111 (2003); Sonja Starr, Rethinking 
“Effective Remedies”: Remedial Deterrence in International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (2008). 
77 Cf. Cras & Daly, supra note 52, at 67 (reporting that the Irish exclusionary rule has “evolved over many 
years and is, in fact, still in a state of flux”). 
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Around the world, efficiency fever has gripped criminal justice systems. 
Countries as varied as France, India, Nigeria, and Poland have increasingly sought to 
reform their procedures to expedite case flow. 78 An array of different mechanisms have 
been introduced to accomplish these ends, ranging from diversion to penal orders to 
summary trials, and increasingly commonly, plea bargaining.79  
Plea bargaining has been at the forefront of the trend toward a more economical 
criminal process. In adversarial systems, plea bargaining has been practiced for decades 
and accepted by courts (at times begrudgingly) since at least the 1970s.80 In inquisitorial 
systems, it has spread rapidly since the 1990s, overcoming longstanding resistance to 
“trading with justice.”81 Despite its global ascendance, plea bargaining remains deeply 
controversial in both adversarial and inquisitorial systems. The objections to the 
practice are manifold, but a central criticism is that it conflicts with the search for 
truth.82  
                                                 
78 See, e.g., REGINA RAUXLOH, PLEA BARGAINING IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-2 (2012); JENIA 
IONTCHEVA TURNER, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS 1 (2009); Stephen C. Thaman, A Typology of 
Consensual Criminal Procedures: An Historical and Comparative Perspective on the Theory and Practice of 
Avoiding the Full Criminal Trial, in WORLD PLEA BARGAINING 297, 345-46 (Stephen C. Thaman ed., 2010); 
Langer, supra note 72. 
79 See, e.g., Thaman, supra note 78, at 345-46; Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1413, 1441-53 (2011). The term plea bargaining is not entirely accurate when applied to 
inquisitorial systems, which still do not accept formal guilty pleas, but instead require confessions or 
admissions of guilt. But for the sake of readability, I use it to here to denote any “process of negotiation 
and explicit agreement between the defendant, on one hand, and the prosecution, the court, or both, on 
the other, whereby the defendant confesses, pleads guilty, or provides other assistance to the government 
in exchange for more lenient treatment.” TURNER, supra note 78, at 1. 
80 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); see also R. v. Winterflood [1979] Crim. L.R. 263, cited in 
RAUXLOH, supra note 78, at 26 (accepting charge bargaining under the condition that it is practiced 
openly); Joseph Di Luca, Expedient McJustice or Principled Alternative Dispute Resolution? A Review of Plea 
Bargaining in Canada, 50 CRIM. L. Q. 14, 41-46 (2005) (discussing the mixed reactions to plea bargaining in 
Canadian case law from the 1970s and 1980s). But see RAUXLOH, supra note 78, at 29-31 (noting that in the 
1970s, the English Court of Appeal attempted to discourage sentence bargaining, but after it was largely 
ignored by lower courts and practitioners, it eventually began accepting the practice in the mid-1980s). 
81 See, e.g., Thaman, supra note 78, at xvii. 
82 See, e.g., George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 859 (2000) (“In place of a noble clash 
for truth, plea bargaining gives us a skulking truce.”). 
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 That plea bargaining stands at odds with a quest for truth in criminal cases is 
commonly asserted, but less frequently explained.83 The answer is not as simple as it is 
for the exclusionary rule. To begin, the right question is not simply how plea bargaining 
conflicts with truthseeking, but rather whether it is worse than trials at uncovering the 
truth. Trials are also not perfectly accurate, so we must measure plea bargaining 
outcomes not simply in absolute terms, but also by how they compare relative to trial 
outcomes. 84  
There are two principal ways in which plea bargaining—at least as practiced in 
the United States and a number of other adversarial jurisdictions—increases the risk of 
inaccurate verdicts. First, a sizeable plea discount can induce even some innocent 
defendants to waive their right to trial and plead guilty.85 The even more common 
scenario is this: In exchange for sentencing or charge reductions, defendants who are 
guilty of some crime may agree to plead guilty to another crime. This obviously does 
not accurately represent their conduct and thus impairs the search for truth.86  
The minimal judicial supervision of charging decisions and guilty pleas 
heightens the risk of inaccuracy. If prosecutors have exclusive authority over decisions 
                                                 
83 For a notable exception in the U.S. literature, see Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the 
Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1610-12 (2005). The conflict between plea 
bargaining and truth-seeking is much more commonly discussed in the German academic literature. See, 
e.g., STAMP, supra note 3, at 149-51; Thomas Weigend, The Decay of the Inquisitorial Ideal: Plea Bargaining 
Invades Criminal Procedure, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL 
CONTEXT 39, 56-62 (John Jackson et al. eds., 2008). 
84 Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUDIES 289, 316 (1983). The 
high burden of proof, the uncertain reliability of testimonial evidence, and exclusionary rules are 
examples of hindrances to the search for truth at trial. See, e.g., LAUDAN, supra note 3, passim; Dan Simon, 
Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. L. REV. 143 (2011). 
85 See, e.g., KARSTEN ALTENHAIN ET AL., DIE PRAXIS DER ABSPRACHEN IN WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFVERFAHREN 134 
(2007); SAMUEL R. GROSS ET AL., EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989 THROUGH 2003, at 12 (2004), at 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/exon_report.pdf; Michael O. Finkelstein, A 
Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 293, 309-10 (1975); Ronald 
F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 85-86 
(2005); Russell D. Covey, Plea Bargaining After Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 595, 597, 616 (2013) (citing 
data that 9% of exonerated inmates had pleaded guilty). 
86 See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Punishing The Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1170-71 (2008). 
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to dismiss or reduce charges, with no meaningful oversight by the judiciary, they can 
negotiate charge bargains that significantly misrepresent the criminal conduct for which 
a defendant is responsible.87 Particularly when judges’ sentencing discretion is limited, 
prosecutors’ charging choices also largely determine the punishment that a defendant is 
facing, which gives prosecutors enormous leverage during negotiations.88  
In principle, judges can exercise some oversight over the product of plea 
negotiations when they examine whether a guilty plea is voluntary, knowing, and 
factually based.89 Yet the pressure of heavy caseloads leads judges to conduct a cursory 
review, requiring little more than the defendant’s confirmation that the allegations in 
the indictment are correct.90 Whereas at trial, a neutral judge or jury evaluates the 
evidence carefully and weighs the credibility of witnesses after cross-examination, at a 
plea hearing, judges test the facts only superficially, based on meager documentary 
evidence and a brief questioning of the defendant, but no other witnesses.91 
Once a plea agreement is negotiated, the parties themselves have no incentive to 
question its validity, so they commonly acquiesce to the pro forma review by the court. 
                                                 
87 In common-law jurisdictions, judges typically may not interfere with prosecutorial decisions to dismiss 
or reduce charges. See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379-81 (2d 
Cir. 1973); United States v. Giannattasio, 979 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1992); Vanscoy v. Ontario [1999] O.J. 
No. 1661, 1999 CarswellOnt 1427, ¶ 38 (Ont. S.C.J.) (observing that the prosecution in Canada has 
“complete discretion” in charge bargaining); ANDREW ASHWORTH & MIKE REDMAYNE, THE CRIMINAL 
PROCESS 80 (4th ed. 2010) (“In recent years there have been some cases of successful judicial review of 
certain policies for and against prosecution, but the prevailing attitude remains one of reluctance.”); 
Waye & Marcus, supra note 30, at 348-49 (noting that in Australia, judicial review of prosecutorial 
decisions is limited and charge bargaining is well-entrenched). 
88 See, e.g., Wright, supra note, at 129. Mandatory minimum sentences and rigid sentencing guidelines are 
not used as broadly in other systems as they are in the United States. See, e.g., Juliet Horne, Plea Bargains, 
Guilty Pleas and the Consequences for Appeal in England and Wales 4, at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2286681; Waye & Marcus, supra note 30, at 377, 383. 
89 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 11; CAN. CRIM. CODE § 606; S. AFR. CRIM. PROC. ACT § 105A(6)(a). 
90 See, e.g., PIZZI, supra note 5, at 73, 187; Brown, supra note 83, at 1611; Jacqueline Hodgson, Guilty Pleas 
and the Changing Role of the Prosecutor in French Criminal Justice, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 116, 128 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds. 2012); Kent Roach, Canada’s Experience with 
Constitutionalism and Criminal Justice, 25 SINGAPORE ACADEMY L. J. 656, 672 (2013); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, 
Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiation: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 212-23 (2006).  
91 See Brown, supra note 83, at 1610. 
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At the negotiation stage, when the prosecution and defense may benefit from greater 
access to information, such information may be unavailable or it may be too costly to 
obtain. In adversarial systems, the defense frequently lacks access to the prosecutor’s 
evidence before negotiating a plea. At least in the United States, prosecutors need not 
disclose even certain evidence favorable to the defendant at that stage.92 While other 
adversarial jurisdictions tend to provide for more extensive pre-plea disclosure, it is still 
not as broad as the disclosure provided just before trial;93 moreover, at least in some 
adversarial jurisdictions, plea bargaining is increasingly occurring before charges are 
filed and therefore before disclosure obligations attach.94 Adequate investigation by the 
defense is further constrained by the short time limits on plea offers, the heavy 
caseloads carried by most defense attorneys, and the limited funding for defense 
investigations.95 
Accuracy in plea bargaining is also impaired because prosecutors tend to 
negotiate deals early in their investigation, in order to conserve valuable investigative 
and trial preparation resources. They frequently offer greater concessions for early 
guilty pleas and, in some cases, leave plea agreements open for only a limited time 
before trial.96 The haste to conclude an agreement deprives prosecutors from useful 
information they could glean from a more thorough investigation, and it increases the 
risk of factual errors. 
                                                 
92 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002). Even when the defense has the right to access some of the 
prosecution’s evidence, the waiver of that right is frequently an element of the negotiations. See id.; 
Brown, supra note 83, at 1612. 
93 See CRIM. JUST. ACT (ENG.), ch. 44 § 37 (2003); CRIM. DISCLOSURE ACT (N.Z.) §§ 12-13 (2008); R. v. 
Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (Can.); R. v. Taillefer & R. v. Duguay, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 307 (Can.); P.J.L. 
Rofe, Disclosure by Both Sides, Australian Institute of Criminology, at 
http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/conferences/prosecuting/rofe.pdf. 
94 ANDREW SANDERS ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE  464 (4th ed. 2010). 
95 Brown, supra note 83, at 1612; see also MIKE MCCONVILLE ET AL., STANDING ACCUSED: THE ORGANISATION 
AND PRACTICES OF CRIMINAL DEFENCE LAWYERS IN BRITAIN 65-68 (1994); RAUXLOH, supra note 78, at 50. 
96 E.g., Turner, supra note 90, at 211. 
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Finally, at least in adversarial systems, verdicts based on guilty pleas are 
typically not supported by a thorough reasoned judgment (or any reasoned judgment at 
all),97 and appeals of negotiated verdicts are more circumscribed than appeals from 
contested cases.98 This arrangement reduces the system’s ability to correct inaccuracies. 
While many plea bargains conflict with truthseeking for the reasons just 
discussed, some can also help uncover facts that would otherwise remain unknown to 
prosecutors. Cooperation agreements, under which the prosecution offers concessions 
to a defendant in exchange for his agreement to reveal information about other 
defendants or to participate in undercover investigations, can assist the search for truth, 
at least in some cases. But the precise extent to which cooperation agreements promote 
truthseeking is subject to debate.  
Some scholars have argued that cooperation agreements are less likely to 
implicate innocent defendants because such defendants are less likely to be useful as 
links to a criminal enterprise and “are likely to redirect investigative efforts to the 
worthiest targets.”99 But others have raised serious concerns about the reliability of 
informants who receive concessions in exchange for cooperation.100 They have pointed 
out the risk that defendants may falsely accuse other persons in order to obtain a good 
bargain.101 Likewise, some have criticized the lenient treatment given to cooperating 
defendants who can provide valuable information only because of their deep 
                                                 
97 Thaman, supra note 78, at 367-69. One should note, however, that in some adversarial systems, juries 
(and sometimes judges) may not be required to provide reasoned judgments even after a contested case. 
Id. at 367. 
98 See, e.g., Jenia Iontcheva Turner & Thomas Weigend, Negotiated Justice, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES AND RULES 1403 (Göran Sluiter et al. eds. 2013); Horne, supra note 88. While 
review after a jury (guilty) verdict in adversarial systems is also limited, it is broader and much more 
rarely waived (in only about 20% of cases) than in cases following a guilty plea. In inquisitorial systems, 
where appeals after trial are typically more searching, this comparison is more meaningful. 
99 Jacqueline Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 717, 730-31 (2006). 
100 E.g., ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 
70-72 (2009). 
101 Id. 
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involvement in a criminal enterprise.102 Such defendants may help the search for truth 
with respect to other investigations, but to the extent their cooperation is rewarded with 
lesser charges, it could undermine accuracy in their own case. For these reasons and 
others, inquisitorial countries have been slower than their adversarial counterparts to 
embrace cooperation agreements.103 
In the final analysis, the principal defense of plea bargaining is that even if it 
deemphasizes the search for truth in particular cases, it yields a net benefit for truth-
seeking across the board. By freeing up resources that prosecutors and courts can use to 
pursue more offenders, the argument goes, plea bargaining may help resolve more 
cases and thus achieve an overall gain in criminal law enforcement.104 Negotiated justice 
may be rough and in some sense more superficial, but its reach is far broader. At least 
for those who accept utilitarian principles, the overall gain in the enforcement of 
criminal law may be worth the risk that we will uncover fewer facts in individual cases.  
There are several potential problems with this view, however. First, it is 
practically impossible to assess objectively whether the disadvantages of reduced 
accuracy in individual cases outweigh the benefit from the resolution of more cases. 
Second, plea bargaining seriously limits what we learn about individual cases, and this 
has consequences beyond the mere decrease in accuracy. The shallower resolution of 
cases may provide less solace to victims, hinder the system’s ability to diagnose the 
causes underlying different crimes, and in the end undermine various goals of 
punishment. Finally, overuse of coercive tactics in plea bargaining means that a certain 
                                                 
102 E.g., United States v. Griffin, 17 F.3d 269, 274 (8th Cir. 1994) (J. Bright, dissenting). 
103 E.g., TURNER, supra note 78, at 109-12, 153. Some of the concerns that inquisitorial systems have about 
cooperation agreements—having to do with reliability of the evidence or the principle of legality—are 
similar to concerns about using undercover informants. See Jacqueline E. Ross, The Place of Covert 
Surveillance in Democratic Societies: A Comparative Study of the United States and Germany, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 
493, 501, 506-510 (2007). 
104 Damaška, supra note 4, at 307 n.46; Easterbrook, supra note 84, at 297. Cf. NANCY AMOURY COMBS, 
GUILTY PLEAS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 5-6 (2007) (making this argument in the context of 
international criminal cases, where prosecution is the exception rather than the norm). 
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number of innocent persons plead guilty, which is a result no one interested in just and 
accurate outcomes should desire.105  
While it may be difficult to calculate the precise effect of plea bargaining on the 
search for truth in the criminal justice system, it is clear that certain features of plea 
bargaining—sizeable plea discounts, minimal judicial supervision, lack of transparency 
and disclosure—are particularly likely to undermine truthseeking in individual cases.  
Even if one is satisfied that plea bargaining is on the whole beneficial to the search for 
truth, it is still worth studying these procedures to see if their negative effects in 
individual cases can be minimized without significantly reducing efficiency. From a 
comparative perspective, it is notable that certain inquisitorial and international 
jurisdictions have made more serious attempts to limit these truth-impairing 
procedures. 
To begin, inquisitorial countries have reduced the likelihood that plea bargaining 
would conflict with the search for truth by imposing restrictions on charging and 
sentencing reductions that can be offered in exchange for a guilty plea.  As noted 
earlier, this helps minimize risk that innocent persons might plead guilty, as well as the 
risk that charges would misrepresent the defendant’s conduct. In the United States, few 
jurisdictions regulate charge or sentence reductions or other concessions offered as part 
of a plea bargain. A few other adversarial jurisdictions have begun introducing 
presumptive plea discounts, although enforceable limits are still the exception rather 
than the norm in the common-law world.106 More importantly, guidelines on plea 
                                                 
105 Although this is a question about the distribution of error and not simply about accuracy, it remains 
relevant as one considers whether mistakes in individual cases are worth a net gain in accuracy across the 
board. 
106 For England, see Sentencing Guidelines Council, Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea: Definitive 
Guideline (2007) (setting out discounts between 1/10 and 1/3 depending on the timeliness of the plea). The 
most recent government had proposed increasing the discount to 50% for early pleas, but this proposal 
was abandoned. See Ken Clarke Forced to Abandon 50% Sentence Cuts for Guilty Pleas, THE GUARDIAN (June 
20, 2011), at http://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/jun/20/ken-clarke-abandon-sentence-cuts; Sally 
Lipscombe & Jacqueline Beard, Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea, SN/HA/5974 (Feb. 5, 2013). In New 
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discounts remain of little use, if, as is the case in most adversarial jurisdictions, charge 
bargaining remains common and largely unregulated.107  
In inquisitorial systems, by contrast, prosecutors are more limited in their ability 
to negotiate about charges.108 Many of these systems follow the principle of mandatory 
prosecutions, under which prosecutors are required (at least in more serious cases) to 
bring charges where sufficient evidence exists.109 Even in systems that do not follow the 
mandatory prosecution principle, charge bargaining is regarded as impermissible 
because of its conflict with the search for truth, a central principle of inquisitorial (and 
international) criminal procedure.110 Reflecting this preference for factual and legal 
accuracy, inquisitorial systems allow judges to modify the legal characterization of the 
facts alleged in the indictment. If judges believe the evidence warrants it, they may 
substitute more serious charges than those initially filed by the prosecution, as long as 
they give notice to the defendant and the opportunity to respond and adjust his 
defense.111 
                                                                                                                                                             
South Wales, Australia, plea discounts were regulated for several years, but the relevant legislation was 
recently repealed. Criminal Case Conferencing Trial Act, 2008 (NSW), repealed by Criminal Case 
Conferencing Trial Repeal Bill, 2012 (NSW). 
107 See, e.g., RAUXLOH, supra note 78, at 25-26; SANDERS ET AL., supra note 94, at 463-68 (4th ed. 2010); Fiona 
Leverick, Plea Bargaining in Scotland: The Rise of Managerialism and the Fall of Due Process, in WORLD PLEA 
BARGAINING, supra note 78, at 129-33, 153; Waye & Marcus, supra note 30, at 349 (noting that in Australia, 
“charge bargaining is well entrenched . . . with studies reporting that defense counsel engage in charge 
bargaining in at least 50% of their cases”). But cf. SANDERS ET AL., supra note 94, at 468 (observing that in 
England and Wales, the Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate is trying to reduce the incidence of 
charge bargaining). 
108 E.g., Turner & Weigend, supra note 98, at 1402 (discussing other jurisdictions in which the principle of 
legality hinders charge bargaining). 
109 See, e.g., StPO § 170(1). 
110 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judgment ¶ 65 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 2, 2003); see also GRUBER ET AL., supra note 34, at 42-43 (observing that 
charge bargaining does not occur in Argentina, although prosecutors are independent from the judiciary 
in their decisions to file or dismiss charges). 
111 StPO § 265. For a list of similar provisions in other national jurisdictions, see Carsten Stahn, 
Modification of the Legal Characterization of Facts in the ICC System: A Portrayal of Regulation 55, 16 CRIM. L. F. 
1, 5-6 (2005). 
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Plea bargaining in inquisitorial systems is therefore typically restricted to 
bargaining about the sentence.112 Moreover, sentence discounts are often capped or 
presumptively set at around one-third.113 The baseline sentences from which plea 
discounts are assessed are also significantly milder.114 Finally, in a number of 
inquisitorial countries, plea bargaining is limited to only certain minor offenses which 
carry mild sanctions.115 These three factors—particularly in combination—help reduce 
the pressure on defendants to plead guilty to crimes they did not commit. 
Another way in which inquisitorial systems have reduced the truth-impairing 
nature of plea bargaining is by ensuring that bargains occur after a thorough inquiry 
into the facts by law enforcement and the prosecution. In adversarial systems guilty 
pleas are often sought early in the investigation, and early pleas are typically rewarded 
more generously.116 By contrast, in inquisitorial systems, negotiations usually occur only 
after the completion of a thorough pretrial investigation.117 The investigation is more 
thorough for various reasons, some of which are a function of professional culture and 
                                                 
112 See, e.g., StPO §257c. 
113 Thaman, supra note 78, at 350-52. Even in systems where plea discounts are limited to a certain 
percentage of the expected post-trial sentence, the limits do not take into account the value of reducing a 
sentence of imprisonment to probation. Moreover, in systems where judges have broad sentencing 
discretion, discount limits may not be perfectly effective in practice. Judges may be able to manipulate the 
anticipated post-trial sentence so as to provide a larger discount than formally allowed. 
114 Sentences in continental Europe are significantly milder than those in the US, while other adversarial 
systems, such as Canada and Australia, fall somewhere in the middle. See, e.g., JAMES WHITMAN, HARSH 
JUSTICE 71 (2005); Waye & Marcus, supra note 30, at 377-85; Cheryl Marie Webster & Anthony N. Doob, 
Punitive Trends and Stable Imprisonment Rates in Canada, 36 CRIME & JUST. 297 (2007). 
115 Thaman, supra note 78, at 348. 
116 CRIM. JUST. ACT (Eng.) § 144(1) (a) (2003); Sentencing Guidelines Council, Reduction in Sentence for a 
Guilty Plea: Definitive Guideline ¶ 5.3 (2007); Turner, supra note 90, at 211 (discussing the United States). 
But cf. Joseph Di Luca, Expedient McJustice or Principled Alternative Dispute Resolution? A Review of Plea 
Bargaining in Canada, 50 CRIM. L. Q. 14, 54, 64-65 (2005) (observing that, despite efforts to move plea 
bargaining earlier in the process, guilty pleas in Canada too often occur on the day of trial because the 
prosecution had not had an opportunity to review the file in detail and the defense had not received the 
Crown briefs before then). 
117 See Langer, supra note 72, at 54-55; Thaman, supra note 78, at 357-59; Turner, supra note 90, at 229-30. 
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resource allocation, while others reflect formal legal requirements.118 Although there is 
great variation across inquisitorial systems, in general, prosecutors tend to be more 
closely involved in the investigation than they are in adversarial systems.119  
Prosecutors also have a duty to uncover both exculpatory and inculpatory 
evidence in inquisitorial systems and at international criminal courts.120 While this 
requirement is not always sufficient to ensure a more thorough and objective 
investigation,121 education, training, and professional culture help to reinforce the self-
identification of prosecutors as neutral “organs of justice.”122 Because many inquisitorial 
systems have traditionally measured prosecutors’ performance along qualitative rather 
than quantitative lines, prosecutors tend to take the task of seeking evidence for both 
sides seriously.123  
Even when prosecutors do not take the initiative to pursue exculpatory leads, at 
least in some inquisitorial jurisdictions, the defense has the right to request that they 
undertake specific investigative measures.124 Defendants in inquisitorial jurisdictions 
                                                 
118 See, e.g., JACKSON & SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 72; Gwladys Gilliéron, The Risks of Summary Proceedings, 
Plea Bargains, and Penal Orders in Producing Wrongful Convictions in the U.S. and Europe, in WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS AND MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 237, 250 (C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias eds. 2013). Cf. 
Abraham Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. 
L. REV. 1009 (1971) (“The operation of any model and of the procedure reflecting it will depend upon the 
interaction of many factors: the normative content of the standards to be applied in making decisions, 
how the participants are perceived and trained, the controls introduced at strategic points, and the 
resources assigned to implement policies and controls.”). 
119 See, e.g., Hodgson, supra note 90, at 121-22. 
120 E.g., StPO § 160; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 11, art. 54(1). 
121 See, e.g., Heribert Ostendorf, Strafvereitelung durch Strafverteidigung, 28 NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT 1345, 1348 (1978); Jacqueline Hodgson, The Role of the Criminal Defence Lawyer in an 
Inquisitorial Procedure: Legal and Ethical Constraints, 9 LEGAL ETHICS 125, 135-36, 136 n.48 (2006). 
122 E.g., SHAWN MARIE BOYNE, THE GERMAN PROSECUTION SERVICE: GUARDIANS OF THE LAW? 233-35 (214); 
James Q. Whitman, Equality in Criminal Law: The Two Divergent Western Roads, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 119, 
139 (2009). 
123 Cf. BOYNE, supra note 122, passim (observing the continued influence of the norm of objectivity on 
German prosecutors, but noting how certain competing influences, including an increased focus on 
efficiency, at times interfere with prosecutors’ commitment to objectivity). 
124 See, e.g., Piotr Kruszynski, The Investigative Stage of the Criminal Process in Poland, in SUSPECTS IN EUROPE, 
supra note 52, at 196; Volker Krey & Oliver Windgätter, The Untenable Situation of German Criminal Law: 
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typically cannot waive their right to an attorney in a plea bargained case, unlike their 
American counterparts.125 
Another accuracy-enhancing feature of inquisitorial systems is that judges and 
defense attorneys have access to the investigative file before plea negotiations.126 The 
prosecution can prevent the defense from seeing certain portions of the file while the 
investigation is still ongoing, but plea bargaining rarely occurs at that stage.127 Unlike 
their American counterparts, prosecutors in inquisitorial systems and at the 
international criminal courts do not seek waivers of this right to review the 
investigative file; in any event, such waivers would likely be held unlawful in at least 
some inquisitorial jurisdictions.128 
Rules concerning judicial supervision of admissions of guilt also tend to be 
stricter in inquisitorial systems. Judges have an independent duty to establish the 
objective truth, and this duty implies a searching review of the facts supporting an 
admission of guilt.129 In some inquisitorial countries, courts are constitutionally 
                                                                                                                                                             
Against Quantitative Overloading, Qualitative Overcharging, and the Overexpansion of Criminal Justice, 13 
GERMAN L.J. 579, 586-92 (2012); see also Giulio Illuminati & Michele Caianiello, The Investigative Stage of the 
Criminal Process in Italy, in SUSPECTS IN EUROPE, supra note 52, at 142 (noting that Italian defense attorneys 
can conduct their own investigations and request the assistance of the prosecution with some of the 
investigations);. But cf. Jan Fermon et al., The Investigative Stage of the Criminal Process in Belgium, in 
SUSPECTS IN EUROPE, supra note 52, at 55-56 (noting that defense attorneys have increasing ability to 
influence the pre-trial investigation, at least in more serious cases, but that overall, they are still seen as 
obstacles, rather than contributors, to the search for truth in criminal cases); Hodgson, supra note 90, at 
129 (noting the difficulties experienced by French attorneys “who sought to assert the rights of their 
clients to participate in the investigation, and to propose a line of inquiry that pointed away from the 
guilt of the suspect”). 
125 E.g., Hodgson, supra note 90, at 127; Thomas Weigend & Jenia Turner, The Constitutionality of Negotiated 
Criminal Judgments in Germany, 15 GERMAN L.J. 81, 103 (2014). 
126 StPO § 147 (1); Gilliéron, supra note 118, at 250; Hodgson, supra note 90, at 127. 
127 StPO § 147 (2) (providing that during the investigative stage, the prosecution may limit disclosure to 
protect the integrity of the investigation); see also id. § 68 (4) (providing that a witness’s name and address 
may be removed from the file as long as there exists a risk of harm to the witness from the disclosure of 
this information); Kruszynski, supra note 124, at 196 (noting similar limits to disclosure in Poland). 
128 See Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of March 19, 2013, BVerfG, 2 BvR 2628/10, BvR 
2883/10, 2 BvR 2155/11. 
129 See, e.g., Hodgson, supra note 90, at 128; Weigend & Turner, supra note 125, at 85, 97.   
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prohibited from relying solely on the defendant’s confession as the basis for a verdict.130 
Both legislation and court decisions across inquisitorial systems emphasize judges’ duty 
to go beyond the defendant’s admissions of guilt to verify its accuracy. At a minimum, 
judges must examine the investigative file to determine if it contains independent 
evidence corroborating the admissions.131 In many jurisdictions outside the United 
States, judges are also not allowed to accept so-called Alford pleas or equivocal pleas, in 
which the defendant protests his innocence while entering a formal guilty plea.132 
Finally, inquisitorial judges have the requisite tools to pursue the truth 
independently of the parties. In most systems, they can and do consult the investigative 
file before reviewing an admission of guilt.133 In some, they also participate in the plea 
negotiations, and this gives them a fuller picture of the facts of the case.134 Finally, 
judges can call and examine their own witnesses and order further investigative 
measures to determine the true facts before deciding whether to accept a plea 
agreement.135 
When plea negotiations do produce factual errors, these errors are more likely to 
be caught and corrected in those systems that require a reasoned judgment and provide 
for appellate review in negotiated cases. In inquisitorial systems and at international 
criminal courts, unlike in adversarial systems, reasons for the verdict tend to be 
                                                 
130 TURNER, supra note 78, at 273. 
131 Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of March 19, 2013, BVerfG, 2 BvR 2628/10, BvR 2883/10, 2 
BvR 2155/11; see also Hodgson, supra note 90, at 128. 
132 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 28 (1970) (permitting such pleas); Thaman, supra note 78, at 
356 (listing inquisitorial jurisdictions that require an admission of guilt before accepting a plea 
agreement); Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald 
and Judge Vohrah ¶ 29 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia, Oct. 7, 1997) (requiring that guilty 
pleas be unequivocal and listing national jurisdictions that follow the same rule). Some inquisitorial 
jurisdictions, such as Spain, Italy, and Russia, do not require an admission of guilt by the defendant. But 
even there, judges would likely not accept a plea agreement if the defendant actually asserts his 
innocence; this would be inconsistent with the requirement that the defendant accept the charges against 
him. See Thaman, supra note 78, at 355-56. 
133 See supra note 126. 
134 Thaman, supra note 78, at 360-61; Turner & Weigend, supra note 98, at 1403-04. 
135 E.g., StPO § 244; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 11, art. 65. 
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required in plea bargained cases.136 The reasoning is typically shorter, however, as it 
relies significantly on the defendant’s admission of guilt. While a few inquisitorial 
countries limit appeals of negotiated judgments, others make appeal available as 
broadly as in contested cases; moreover, at least in some jurisdictions, a plea agreement 
may not include an appeals waiver.137 
 The above overview may leave the impression that plea bargaining is 
significantly less likely to deviate from the search for truth in inquisitorial and 
international criminal jurisdictions than in adversarial ones. This would be a fair 
conclusion if one were to focus solely on the formal rules that regulate plea bargaining. 
But a glance at the practice of plea bargaining reveals a somewhat different picture. 
Empirical studies of plea bargaining in Germany, for example, reveal a wide gap 
between the law on the books and bargaining in practice. 138 The most recent survey, 
conducted in 2011, found the divergence persisting even after the adoption of 
legislation to formalize and regulate the practice.139 A majority of judges surveyed 
admitted that they concluded more than half of their negotiations “informally,” i.e., 
without complying with the requirements of the legislation.140 In a significant 
percentage of cases, judges accepted a formal agreement of the prosecutor’s factual 
allegations by the defendant as the sole basis for finding the defendant guilty, contrary 
to the law’s demand of independently establishing the truth.141 The study also found 
that the subject matter of bargains extended beyond that authorized in the Code. For 
                                                 
136 TURNER, supra note 78, at 272; Thaman, supra note 78, at 368-69. 
137 E.g., StPO § 302(1); Thaman, supra note 78, at 37-71. 
138 See, e.g., ALTENHAIN ET AL., supra note 85; Raimund Hassemer & Gabriele Hippler, Informelle Absprachen 
in der Praxis des deutschen Strafverfahrens, 8 STRAFVERTEIDIGER 360 (1986); Turner, supra note 90, at 217-22. 
139 The study was conducted in 2012 and surveyed 190 criminal court judges from the German state 
Nordrhein-Westfalen. The study also surveyed 68 prosecutors and 76 criminal defense attorneys. 
ALTENHAIN ET AL., supra note 85, at 18-24. The description of the study is adapted from Weigend & 
Turner, supra note 125 at 92-94. 
140 ALTENHAIN ET AL., supra note 85, at 36-37, 146-147. More than a quarter of the respondents said that 
they always concluded deals informally. 
141 Id. at 93. 
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example, many judges listed the contents of the charges as a frequent subject of 
bargaining.142  
Likewise, a study of plea bargaining at the ICTY and ICTR has shown that 
bargaining often involved charge and even fact bargaining, despite the tribunals’ 
repeated pronouncements that such practices would conflict with the search for truth.143 
When the Tribunals’ judges attempted to counter such practices by ignoring charge 
reductions and departing from the prosecutors’ recommended sentences, they 
effectively extinguished the interest of international defendants in guilty pleas.144  
In Russia, judges were found to depart frequently from the formal rules 
concerning plea bargaining. In some cases, they deviated from the rules in order to 
advance the search for truth.145 But more frequently, they ignored provisions of the law 
designed to protect the accuracy of plea bargains. In 16 out of 33 cases studied, judges 
relied only on the investigative file or on the agreement between the parties and did not 
inquire further whether the plea was voluntary or knowing.146 
In short, even in systems that have attempted to regulate plea bargaining and to 
align it more closely with the search for truth, informal practices may push in the 
opposite direction, in favor of a convenient and quick resolution of cases. Such practices 
are difficult to contain, as lawyers and judges have powerful economic and other 
                                                 
142 Id. at 77-78. 
143 COMBS, supra note 104, at 63-71, 97-108. 
144 Nancy Amoury Combs, Obtaining Guilty Pleas for International Crimes: Prosecutorial Difficulties, in THE 
PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 331, 340-41 (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade eds. 2012). 
145 Olga B. Semukhina & K. Michael Reynolds, Plea Bargaining Implementation and Acceptance in Modern 
Russia: A Disconnect Between the Legal Institutions and the Citizens, 19 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 400, 412-14 
(2009). For example, some judges refused to accept an agreement between the parties on the ground that 
‘‘the truth of the case cannot be discovered without full trial” even though such a ground for refusal is 
not available under the law. Id. And some courts have mistakenly allowed appeals of plea-bargained 
cases based on a factual error, even though such appeals are not allowed under the law. Apparently, the 
appeals were seen by judges as necessary to find the true facts of the case. Id. at 414. 
146 Id. at 414. 
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incentives to resolve cases “amicably.”147 As long as certain structural features of the 
criminal justice system persist (expanding criminal codes; increasing numbers and 
complexity of cases, without a corresponding adjustment of human resources; outdated 
trial procedures; and evaluation of criminal justice professionals based on efficiency 
rather than based on quality), formal constraints on plea bargaining will have a more 
limited effect than expected. 
IV. Promoting Democratic Participation: Unreasoned and Unreviewable Jury 
Verdicts  
Another hindrance to the search for truth in criminal cases may arise from 
certain evidentiary and procedural rules associated with jury trials. This Part focuses on 
one such procedure—jury verdicts that contain no reasoning and are subject to limited 
appellate review. I discuss how unreasoned and unreviewable verdicts conflict with 
truth-seeking and why they nevertheless continue to be used in a number of 
jurisdictions around the world.  
Trial by jury has often been introduced into criminal justice systems as an 
element of broader democratic reforms.148 The French Revolution ushered in jury trials 
                                                 
147 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975); Albert 
W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968); Stephanos Bibas, Plea 
Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2470-86 (2004); Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 49-60 (1988); Weigend, supra note 
83, at 52. 
148 Jury trials have not always represented self-government. In some European countries, the jury was 
introduced as a result of Napoleonic conquest. Across a number of jurisdictions in Africa, Asia, and South 
America, it was installed as part of colonial rule and was used as a means of protecting the rights of 
colonists rather than as a guarantor of democracy. See, e.g., Neil Vidmar, The Jury Elsewhere in the World, in 
WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 421, 422-31 (Neil Vidmar ed. 2000). Not surprisingly, a number of post-colonial 
governments abolished juries because of their affiliation with oppressive regimes. Id. Countries that 
follow the adversarial model but do not have jury trials include India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Tanzania, 
Kenya, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. Id. at 422-28; see also RICHARD VOGLER, A WORLD VIEW OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 230 (2005); Daniel Ehighalua, Trial by Jury: Is It About Time for Nigeria? (Feb. 17, 2012), at 
http://wrongfulconvictionsblog.org/2012/02/17/trial-by-jury-is-it-about-time-for-nigeria. While in most of 
these countries, juries were abolished as a sign of rejection of the colonial legal system, in some cases, the 
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as a means of increasing popular participation in the criminal process.149 Liberal 
thinkers in other European countries, influenced by the same democratic ideals, were 
likewise successful in introducing juries in the nineteenth century.150 As authoritarian 
governments took power in several European countries in the early twentieth century, 
however, they limited or entirely abolished lay participation.151 The subsequent return 
of democracy did not always restore juries, although many jurisdictions reintroduced 
lay participation through mixed courts in which professional judges deliberate and 
decide alongside their lay counterparts.152  
The association of juries with democracy can be found in a number of non-
European countries as well. Most recently, South Korea and Japan launched mixed 
courts of judges and jurors in an effort to bolster the democratic legitimacy of their 
criminal justice systems.153 Around the world today, laypersons participate in criminal 
trials in over fifty countries, all of which can be described as roughly democratic.154 
While most of these countries rely on mixed courts of professional judges and jurors, 
more than a dozen (typically common-law) countries employ all-lay juries. 155  
                                                                                                                                                             
abolition of juries was also an effort by authoritarian governments to maintain control over the judiciary. 
Vidmar, supra, at 424. 
149 VOGLER, supra note 148, at 233-36. 
150 See, e.g., Arnd Koch, C.J.A. Mittermaier and the 19th Century Debate About Juries and Mixed Courts, 72 
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 347 (2001); see also VOGLER, supra note 148, at 240-43; Vidmar, 
supra note 148, at 430.  
151 Stephen C. Thaman, Should Criminal Juries Give Reasons for Their Verdicts?: The Spanish Experience and the 
Implications of the European Court of Human Rights Decision in Taxquet v. Belgium, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
613, 619 (2011).  
152 Several jurisdictions, including Spain, Russia, and Georgia, introduced all-lay jury trials as part of their 
transition to democracy. See, e.g., Thaman, supra note 151, at 619-20. 
153 Ryan Park, The Globalizing Jury Trial: Lessons and Insights From Korea, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 525 (2010); 
Ingram Weber, The New Japanese Jury System: Empowering the Public, Preserving Continental Justice, 4 E. ASIA 
L. REV. 125 (2009). 
154 Ethan J. Leib, A Comparison of Criminal Jury Decision Rules in Democratic Countries, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
629, 635-41 (2008); Park, supra note 153, at 527 & n.8. 
155 Taxquet v. Belgium [2010] Eur. Ct. H.R. 1806, ¶ 47 (listing European countries with all-lay jury 
systems); Vidmar, supra note 148. 
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In the academic literature and judicial opinions, juries have been defended on 
several different grounds. One justification is fully consistent with an emphasis on 
truthseeking: It maintains that jurors, with their diverse perspectives and deliberative 
decision-making process, are more likely to reach accurate outcomes.156 Other rationales 
for jury trials are not linked to the jury’s factfinding abilities but instead emphasize the 
jury’s democratic virtues. Jury trials are praised for giving ordinary citizens a say in the 
criminal process and for producing verdicts that are more consistent with community 
standards of justice.157 These features are said to increase “public confidence in the 
fairness of the criminal justice system.”158  
Juries are also prized as a symbol of rejecting authoritarian government and a 
means of controlling biased or corrupt judges.159 As Patrick Devlin colorfully remarked, 
the jury is “the lamp that shows that freedom lives.”160 This association with democratic 
government and the protection of individual liberties is one of the main reasons why 
juries retain such a strong symbolic significance today, even as their practical influence 
has sharply decreased.161 
One of the main reasons why juries are “uncongenial to authoritarian rule” is 
that, in many systems, they can “reach a verdict based on conscience, against the letter 
of the law, and occasionally in defiance of government.”162 The ability to render verdicts 
                                                 
156 See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 217-18, 223 
(1989); Toby S. Goldbach & Valerie P. Hans, Juries, Lay Judges, and Trials, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE *5 (Gerben Bruinsma & David Weisburd eds., forthcoming 2014); see 
also AK v Western Australia, [2008] HCA 8, 232 CLR 438, 492. 
157 See, e.g., AK, [2008] 232 CLR 438; R. v. G. (R.M.), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 362, ¶ 13 (S.C.C.). 
158 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). 
159 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968). Juries are said to “support democratic forms of 
government, because they are uncongenial to authoritarian rule.” Richard O. Lempert, The 
Internationalization of Lay Decision-Making: Jury Resurgence and Jury Research, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 477, 481 
(2007). 
160 PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 164 (1966), cited in AK, [2008] 232 CLR at 489. 
161 Sally Lloyd-Bostock & C. Thomas, Decline of the ‘Little Parliament’: Juries and Jury Reform in England and 
Wales, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 40 (1999); see also MARIJKE MALSCH, DEMOCRACY IN THE COURTS 2 (2009). 
162 Bostock & Thomas, supra note 161, at 40.  
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against the law rests on the unique procedural arrangement that is the subject of 
discussion in this chapter—the unreasoned, and in the case of acquittals, unreviewable 
jury verdict. While often extolled as a principal virtue of juries, it is also the subject of 
intense criticism.163 
Critics of the jury target a variety of perceived flaws of the institution. For 
purposes of this chapter, I address the critiques that concern the jury’s ability to render 
truthful verdicts. These critiques take three main forms. Some commentators challenge 
the jury’s capacity to discern facts accurately, particularly in more complex cases that 
involve scientific or statistical evidence. 164 Others focus on the jury’s perceived 
weakness in understanding and following the law.165 Finally, a number of critics focus 
not on the cognitive capacities of jurors, but rather on the truth-thwarting features of 
certain procedural and evidentiary rules associated with jury trials.166 
Empirical evidence does not bear out the first critique. While jurors do suffer 
from certain cognitive biases that affect all humans, they are not less likely to produce 
accurate outcomes than professional judges. On the whole, jurors do not appear to be 
worse at discerning facts than judges are, even in cases where the evidence is technical 
                                                 
163 For a review of some of the debates, see Darryl Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 
MINN. L. REV. 1149 (1997); Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice 
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 700-03 (1995); Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a 
Controversy, 43 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 85-111 (1980).  
164 Jurors are frequently “thought to more easily believe lies, to evaluate expert testimony uncritically, and 
to insufficiently attend to relevant information.” Thomas Bliesener, Lay Judges in the German Criminal 
Court: Social-Psychological Aspects of the German Criminal Justice System, in UNDERSTANDING WORLD JURY 
SYSTEMS THROUGH SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 179, 186 (Martin F. Kaplan & Ana M. Martín eds. 
2006) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING WORLD JURY SYSTEMS]; Daniel Shuman & Anthony Champagne, 
Removing the People from the Legal Process—The Rhetoric and Research on Judicial Selection and Juries, 3 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 242, 249-56 (1997). 
165  More specifically, jurors are blamed for failing to understand and follow jury instructions and for 
deciding cases based on innate notions of justice rather than the written law. E.g., NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE 
HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 158-63 (2007); see also DAMAŠKA, supra note 32, at 29 n.6 (“On the 
Continent, where the machinery of justice is dominated by professional civil servants, Hegel’s lament—
“the masses are miserable hands at judging”—has a very long history.”). 
166 LAUDAN, supra note 3, at 7, 117-24, 214-17; Weigend, supra note 3, at 165-67. 
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and complex.167 A number of the studies that find difficulties in the comprehension or 
retention of certain facts trace the problem not to the cognitive capacities of jurors, but 
rather to rules that prohibit jurors from taking notes, asking questions of the witnesses 
or lawyers, and seeing certain relevant evidence.168  
A number of studies have also found that jurors have difficulty understanding 
certain aspects of the law and that they struggle to follow legal instructions.169 Yet these 
difficulties diminish when clearer wording is used, when attorneys clarify the 
instructions, or when other preventive measures are taken.170 Moreover, with respect to 
understanding certain limiting instructions (to disregard particular evidence or to 
consider it only for a limited purpose), judges appear to suffer from similar cognitive 
weaknesses.171 Whatever difficulties juries may have in understanding the law, in the 
vast majority of criminal cases, they render the same verdicts that judges would have 
imposed.172 In the few cases where judges and jurors disagree about the outcome of a 
                                                 
167 Shuman & Champagne, supra note 164, at 253-56; see also Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 826–27 (2001). Cf. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 165, at 188 (reporting studies where 
jurors appear to have some difficulty interpreting statistical evidence, but observing that judges 
experienced similar difficulties).  
168 See, e.g., VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 165, at 153-54, 157; Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror 
Comprehension and Public Policy: Perceived Problems and Proposed Solutions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 788, 
795-806 (2000). 
169 Lorraine Hope & Amina Memon, Cross-Border Diversity: Trial by Jury in England and Scotland, in 
UNDERSTANDING WORLD JURY SYSTEMS , supra note 164, at 31, 38 (citing W. YOUNG ET AL., JURIES IN 
CRIMINAL TRIALS: A SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS) (“[T]hese basic misunderstandings persisted 
through, and significantly influenced, jury deliberations despite clarifications provided during the course 
of the judges’ summary.”); see also Jane Goodman-Delahunty & David Tait, Lay Participation in Legal 
Decision-Making in Australia and New Zealand: Jury Trials and Administrative Tribunals, in UNDERSTANDING 
WORLD JURY SYSTEMS, supra, at 61 (“In 1998, a study of 48 jury trials in New Zealand revealed that . . . in 
35 of the 48 trials studied, some of the jurors misunderstood the law, especially the offense charged.”). 
170 VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 165, at 159; Ellsworth & Reifman, supra note 168, at 806-09; Shari Seidman 
Diamond et al., The “Kettleful of Law” in Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1537, 1603-04 (2012). 
171 VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 165, at 164. 
172 HARRY KALVEN, JR., & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 56-58 (1966) (after excluding hung-jury cases, 
finding agreement between judges and juries in 75.4% of cases); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury 
Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven & Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIR. LEG. 
STUDIES 171, 182 (2005) (after excluding hung-jury cases, finding agreement in 70.5% of cases); Sangjoon 
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case, this is typically the result of a reasonable difference in the interpretation of the 
law, not of misunderstanding by jurors.173 
While jurors do not appear to be less capable than judges in discovering the 
truth, certain procedural and evidentiary rules accompanying jury trials may interfere 
with truthseeking. Part II.B discussed certain exclusionary rules that fall in that 
category. This Part focuses on two other features, unreasoned jury verdicts and limited 
appellate review of such verdicts.  
All-lay juries typically do not have to provide a reasoned judgment in support of 
their decisions. By contrast, most jurisdictions today require judges and mixed tribunals 
to submit written reasons for their judgments in criminal cases.174 The lack of reasons for 
jury verdicts in common-law countries is justified on the grounds that it protects the 
confidentiality of jury deliberations and preserves the jury’s ability to render a verdict 
of conscience.  
Common-law systems attempt to make up for the lack of reasons for the jury 
verdict by requiring judges to give jurors elaborate instructions on the law and, in some 
countries, to summarize the evidence.175 In recent years, some jurisdictions have also 
                                                                                                                                                             
Kim et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: The First Three Years of the Korean Jury System, 10 J. 
EMPIR. LEG. STUDIES 35, 42 (2013) (reporting a 91.4% agreement rate). 
173 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 172, at 106-11; VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 165, at 233-34. 
174 The United States is unfortunately an exception to this rule. At the federal level, findings of fact are 
available, but only at the request of the party. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c). More troubling is the fact that many 
states do not require findings of fact in bench trials even upon request. Sean Doran et al., Rethinking 
Adversariness in Nonjury Trials, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 45-46 (1995). 
175 In a number of common-law countries (but not the United States): 
[A]t the conclusion of the evidence, the judge sums up the case to the jurors. He reminds them of 
the evidence they have heard. In doing so, the judge may give directions about the proper 
approach to take in respect of certain evidence. He also provides the jurors with information and 
explanations about the applicable legal rules. In that context, the judge clarifies the elements of 
the offence and sets out the chain of reasoning that should be followed in order to reach a verdict 
based on the jury’s findings of fact. 
Taxquet v. Belgium, [2010] Eur. Ct. H.R. 1806, ¶ 50; see also Yager v. The Queen, [1977] W.A.R. 17, 11 
A.L.R 646 (Austl.); R. v. Krieger, 2 R.C.S. 501 (2006) (Can.); R. v. Osolin, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595, 683 (S.C.C.).  
See generally Paul Marcus, Judges Talking to Jurors in Criminal Cases: Why U.S. Judges Do It So Differently 
from Just About Everyone Else, 30 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2013). 
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experimented with giving jurors decision “flowcharts” and “decision trees,” in addition 
to judicial instructions, to help guide their deliberations.176 A few countries—mostly in 
the civil-law tradition—also present jurors with specific questions that they must 
answer in support of their verdict.177 These are all valuable efforts to reduce inaccurate 
verdicts, but it is not clear whether they go far enough “to shore up … the legitimacy of 
inscrutable jury verdicts.”178 The lack of a reasoned decision is a major reason why 
many continental European countries disfavor the common-law jury trial. It is seen as 
inconsistent with statutory and in some cases constitutional requirements that a 
criminal verdict be based on factual evidence.179  
From a truthseeking perspective, the problem of inscrutable jury verdicts is 
compounded by the limited possibility of appeal. As discussed earlier, appeals of 
acquittals are generally prohibited in adversarial countries, where most all-lay juries are 
found. Although appeals from acquittals from bench trials are also often banned, 
“protection afforded by the double jeopardy principle has been at its strongest where 
the accused has been acquitted by the jury, rather than where the acquittal is delivered 
as a result of a judicial direction.”180  
The restrictions on appeals of jury verdicts of acquittal are often justified on the 
grounds that they safeguard the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, double jeopardy 
protections, and more broadly, the innocence-weighted approach.181 But these rationales 
do not explain the disparate treatment of jury verdicts and court judgments in many 
jurisdictions. Likewise, they do not explain why convictions by juries, which do not 
                                                 
176 Marcus, supra note 175, at 56-58. 
177 This is similar to the “special verdict” questions common in civil-law trials in the United States. Within 
Europe, Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Norway, Russia, and Spain require jurors to answer such questions. 
Taxquet, [2010] Eur. Ct. H.R. 1806, ¶ 49. 
178 DAMAŠKA, supra note 32, at 46. 
179 Cf. id. at 45-46. 
180 The Law Reform Commission (Ireland), supra note 13, ¶ 3.093;  
181 Id. ¶ 2.06.  
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implicate the double jeopardy and standard of proof concerns, are also given great 
deference by reviewing courts. Appellate review is typically more deferential to 
convictions by juries than by judges.182 In some countries, appeals of jury verdicts are 
limited to questions of law, while appeals from bench trials are de novo.183  
Limited appellate review has been explained in part on practical grounds: If the 
jury offers no justification for its decision, appellate courts have no way of discerning 
how the jury evaluated the evidence and applied the law.184 But this reasoning is 
somewhat circular, as it presumes that juries should provide no reasoning. Moreover, 
while the lack of reasoning makes appellate review more challenging, it does not 
entirely preclude such review. The court could examine the evidence in the case de 
novo, or it could assess whether the verdict was one that a reasonable jury could have 
reached.185 It appears that a principal motivation for restricting appeals of jury verdicts, 
particularly of acquittals, is to preserve the autonomy of the jury to apply the “sense of 
the community” and to protect individuals against official abuse of power.186  
Even if one were to accept the value of a mechanism that permits jury 
nullification, however, the lack of reasoning for jury verdicts means that we cannot be 
certain whether an acquittal in a particular case reflects disagreement with the law or 
simply a legal or factual mistake by the jury. Studies of judge-jury disagreements 
suggest that nullification is rarely the motivation for jury acquittals.187 Furthermore, 
because the lack of reasoning extends to convictions and acquittals alike, it makes 
appellate review difficult even when the jury returns a conviction (i.e., when 
nullification is not implicated).  Some commentators have therefore questioned whether 
                                                 
182 PIZZI, supra note 5, at 145. 
183 CODE DE PROCEDURE PENALE § 572 (Fr.); Taxquet, [2010] Eur. Ct. H.R. 1806, ¶ 99.  
184 Cf. R. v. Biniaris, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381, ¶¶ 36-40. 
185 Id. ¶ 40; The Law Reform Commission (Ireland), supra note 13, ¶¶ 3.102-3.103. 
186 People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. O’Shea [1982] IR 384, 438. 
187 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 172, at 115; VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 165, at 234. 
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the benefits of nullification are worth the costs of inscrutable and unreviewable 
verdicts.188  
Reflecting this concern about unreviewable jury verdicts, countries that have 
adopted jury trials more recently have generally opted for more accountable juries.189 In 
Spain and Russia, for example, all-lay juries must respond to specific questions 
concerning the verdict. Spanish juries must also provide reasons for their judgments by 
answering a detailed questionnaire to explain factual findings.190 In both Spain and 
Russia, acquittals can also be reviewed on appeal, and review of both convictions and 
acquittals is said to be rather searching.191 Japan and South Korea adopted juries that fall 
closer to the mixed-court model than full-blown juries, in which professional judges 
(even when they do not participate fully in the deliberations) help produce reasoned 
judgments that can be reviewed on appeal.192 Kazakhstan adopted the traditional 
mixed-court model, in which judges and jurors deliberate and reach a verdict together, 
                                                 
188 E.g., John D. Jackson, Making Juries Accountable, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 477 (2002). 
189 Only Georgia has adopted an essentially American-style jury whose acquittals cannot be reviewed. See 
CRIM. PROC. CODE § 231(4) (Georgia), cited in Thaman, supra note 151, at 619 & n.40. Georgia introduced 
the criminal jury as part of a broader reform to introduce adversarial elements in its criminal procedure, 
and it was very heavily influenced by the U.S. model, which may explain the ban on appeal of acquittals. 
See CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM STRATEGY, at http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/geo/2011-19-appendix-
I.pdf. It also appears that Georgia may have been trying to avoid some of the problems encountered in 
Russia, where appellate courts frequently reversed jury acquittals. See Giorgi Lomsadze, Georgia: Jury 
Trials Aim to Bolster Public Confidence in Courts, Oct. 1, 2010, at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62059. 
190 Ana M. Martín & Martin F. Kaplan, Psychological Perspectives on Spanish and Russian Juries, in 
UNDERSTANDING WORLD JURY SYSTEMS, supra note 164, at 71, 73 (noting that jurors must specifically note 
the evidence that led them to believe that a particular proposition was proved or not proved). As the 
European Court of Human Rights succinctly described the Spanish jury verdict: 
[It] is made up of five distinct parts. The first lists the facts held to be established, the second lists 
the facts held to be not established, the third contains the jury's declaration as to whether the 
accused is guilty or not guilty, and the fourth provides a succinct statement of reasons for the 
verdict, indicating the evidence on which it is based and the reasons why particular facts have 
been held to be established or not. A fifth part contains a record of all the events that took place 
during the discussions, avoiding any identification that might infringe the secrecy of the 
deliberations. 
Taxquet v. Belgium [2010] Eur. Ct. H.R. 1806, ¶ 57. 
191 Martín & Kaplan, supra note 190. 
192 Park, supra note 153, at 523–33; Weber, supra note 153, at 160–64. 
Turner, Limits on the Search for Truth  7/29/2014 
41 
 
and judges produce a reasoned judgment that is subject to review.193 Belgium, which 
has long had trial by jury, has amended its criminal procedure to require juries to 
provide the “main reasons” for their verdicts.194 
More significantly, the European Court of Human Rights recently rendered a 
judgment that may require European countries to devote greater attention to the 
problem of inscrutable and unreviewable jury verdicts. In Taxquet v. Belgium, the Court 
held that jury verdicts may comply with fair trial principles even if they do not provide 
reasons, but it emphasized that states must implement other measures to compensate 
for the brevity of jury verdicts.195 The Court suggested that several procedures 
(seemingly when used in combination) can make up for the lack of a reasoned 
judgment: “directions or guidance provided by the presiding judge to the jurors on the 
legal issues arising or the evidence adduced,” “precise, unequivocal questions put to 
the jury by the judge, forming a framework on which the verdict is based or sufficiently 
offsetting the fact that no reasons are given for the jury’s answers,” and the availability 
of appeal to the accused.196 National courts will therefore have to examine jury 
procedures against these benchmarks to determine whether they guard sufficiently 
against arbitrary verdicts. 
The Taxquet judgment suggests that juries are increasingly expected to be 
accountable for their judgments. Countries that have recently expanded lay 
participation in criminal cases have taken measures to ensure that jury decisions are 
more transparent and reviewable. This emphasis on accountability—together with the 
limited diffusion of criminal jury trials around the world—shows that the democratic 
                                                 
193 Nikolai Kovalev & Gulnar Suleymenova, New Kazakhstani Quasi-Jury System: Challenges, Trends and 
Reforms, 38 INT’L J. L. CRIME & JUST. 261 (2010).  
194 Taxquet, [2010] Eur. Ct. H.R. 1806, ¶ 60. 
195 Id. ¶ 90. 
196 Id. ¶ 92. 
Turner, Limits on the Search for Truth  7/29/2014 
42 
 
virtue of juries is less accepted today as a reason to depart from fair trial principles or 
an emphasis on truthseeking.  
V. Conclusion  
Criminal justice systems around the globe profess a strong commitment to the 
discovery of truth in criminal cases. At the same time, courts and legislatures across the 
adversarial-inquisitorial spectrum increasingly concur that the truth should not be 
sought at any price. Competing values, such as individual rights, efficiency, and 
democratic participation have motivated the introduction of procedures that often 
depart from the singular quest for truth. As a result of a stronger commitment to 
individual rights, many systems today follow rules that exclude unlawfully obtained 
evidence and deprive factfinders of probative evidence. Some also rely on juries to 
provide a democratic check on the criminal process, and by making jury verdicts 
difficult to review and revise, privilege jury autonomy over truthseeking. Finally, a 
growing number of jurisdictions have introduced abbreviated procedures such as plea 
bargaining, which help resolve criminal cases quickly and conveniently, but often less 
accurately. While the trend has not been exclusively in the direction of truth-impairing 
procedures (as reform of double jeopardy laws and requirements of reasoned decisions 
by juries indicate), on the whole, legal systems around the world continue to confirm 
that the search for truth does not trump all other concerns. 
 As these various reforms have occurred, the adversarial-inquisitorial dichotomy 
has become less relevant in determining the commitment of a criminal justice system to 
the discovery of truth. There is broad agreement across systems of both traditions that 
truthseeking should be limited to some degree by the concern for individual rights and 
liberties. While the details differ on how the balance between these competing goals is 
struck, there is as much divergence within inquisitorial systems as across the 
adversarial-inquisitorial divide.  
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Among the procedures that rest in tension with truth-seeking, plea bargaining 
appears at once the most attractive and the most problematic. It is attractive due to its 
undeniable contribution to efficiency in crowded and overworked criminal justice 
systems. It is problematic because its detrimental impact on truthseeking in individual 
cases has proven the most difficult to mitigate. Rules introduced to regulate plea 
bargaining often appear overly inconvenient to prosecutors, defense lawyers, and even 
judges. To a great degree, this is because shrinking resources and broad emphases on 
efficiency dominate criminal justice systems around the world today. As long as this is 
so, effective regulation of plea bargaining is likely to be challenging. The goal of greater 
alignment between plea bargaining and the search for truth, if it is to be reached, will 
demand tough and deep structural reform. 
 
